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13  Adaptive Trade-offs in the Use of Social  
and Personal Information
R ac h el l .  K en dal ,  I sab elle co o len  
&  K e vI n n .  l al an d
13.1. Introduction
Social learning—the acquisition of knowledge from others—provides naive 
animals with information relevant to many life skills, including when, where, 
what, and how to eat (Galef and Giraldeau 2001), with whom to mate (D. 
White 2004) or fight (Peake and McGregor 2004), and which predators to 
avoid and how (A. Griffin 2004). Over the last century, a common assumption 
of behavioral ecologists, ethologists, and anthropologists has been that such 
copying is inherently adaptive. Animals are deemed to gain fitness benefits by 
learning from others, since they acquire adaptive information while avoiding 
some of the costs (predation risk, search costs, etc.) of learning for them-
selves—the costs of “personal information” acquisition. However, the use of 
social information does not, in fact, guarantee success (Boyd and Richerson 
1985, 1995; Rogers 1988; Giraldeau et al. 2002). Individual animals face evo-
lutionary trade-offs between the acquisition of costly but accurate informa-
tion and the use of cheap but potentially less reliable information (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985), here manifest in a trade-off between reliance on personal 
and social information.
Theoretical models investigating the adaptive advantages of social learning 
predict that it should not be employed in an indiscriminate manner, but rather, 
individual animals should have evolved flexible strategies that dictate precise 
circumstances under which they copy others (Laland 2004). Such analyses 
1. Some readers may object to our use of the phrase “unreliable information,” on the grounds 
that the cues that form the bases of social learning are not so much reliable or unreliable as more 
or less informative. While we are sympathetic to this objection, we persist with the terminology 
for three reasons. First, whether appropriate or not, use of such terms is common in the literature 
that we review. Second, there are no obvious alternative expressions that we find entirely satis-
factory. For instance, an “uninformative cue” does not distinguish between a signal designed to 
mislead and a cue that contains no information at all. Third, it is apparent that we are frequently 
concerned with the reliability and error associated with potential social and asocial sources of in-
formation, for which our use of “reliable or unreliable information” can be taken as shorthand.
250  •  kendal, coolen, and laland
reveal that social learners adopting a pure strategy of random copying would 
have higher fitness than asocial learners only when copying is rare, that is, 
when most potential “demonstrators” of new behavior would be asocial learn-
ers who have acquired accurate information by directly sampling the environ-
ment (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 1995; Rogers 1988; Giraldeau et al. 2002). As 
the frequency of social learners increases, the value of using social informa-
tion typically declines, as the proportion of individuals demonstrating accurate 
personal information decreases. At the extreme, with all individuals exhibiting 
random copying, no one would have acquired accurate personal information 
by sampling the environment. In order for it to be adaptive, individuals must 
use social learning selectively and engage in the collection of accurate per-
sonal information some of the time (Galef 1995; Laland 2004).
Despite rapid growth in the field of animal social learning, the circum-
stances under which individuals rely on alternative sources of information 
remain relatively unexplored. What rules have evolved in animals to specify 
how they should exploit personal and social information? Do animals copy 
the behavior of others when they are uncertain how to solve a problem, or, 
perhaps, when it is easy to do so? Do they have rules dictating from whom 
they should copy—for example, high-status or apparently successful individu-
als? Is social learning a last resort when asocial learning has failed, or first 
port of call? Following Laland (2004), the term “social learning strategies” 
is used here to equate evolved learning heuristics with those strategies com-
monly analyzed using evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith 1982) and to 
encourage theoretical analysis. Naturally, animals need not be aware that they 
are following a strategy, nor understand why such strategies may work.
In this chapter we review the predictions arising from theoretical models 
and outline the current empirical support for several social learning strate-
gies, focusing largely on our own experimental studies and other recent work 
(Laland 2004; Kendal et al. 2005; Galef 2006). We draw attention to adaptive 
trade-offs in the use of social and personal information. Laland (2004) dis-
tinguished between two classes of social learning strategy: “when” strategies, 
which dictate the circumstances under which individuals copy others, and 
“who” strategies, which specify from whom individuals learn. We address 
each in turn.
13.2. “When” strategies
13.2.1. copy when asocial learning is costly
Trial-and-error learning is often both costly and error prone. Direct inter-
action with the environment may entail fitness costs, such as injury, sick-
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ness, and predation, as well as “missed opportunity” costs, such as the loss 
of time or energy that could be allocated elsewhere. These costs are expected 
to restrict an animal’s investment in asocial learning, resulting in consequent 
reliance on social learning, which may lead to “errors” such as a failure to 
perform an adaptive behavior or the retention of a suboptimal variant. Where 
these costs are substantive, we anticipate that selection may plausibly have 
favored shortcuts to adaptive solutions, notably copying others (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985).
13.2.1.1. Theoretical background
Several theoretical analyses conclude that reliance upon social information 
should increase as the costs associated with acquiring personal information 
increase (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 1988; Feldman et al. 1996; but see sec-
tion 13.2.2.3). Boyd and Richerson (1985) propose a “costly information hy-
pothesis,” which depicts an evolutionary trade-off between acquiring accurate 
but costly information versus less accurate but cheap information. While this 
trade-off may manifest itself at different levels, for our purposes it can be sum-
marized as the idea that when information is too costly to acquire or to utilize 
personally, individuals will take advantage of the relatively cheap information 
that can be learned from others. A similar argument was proposed by Bandura 
(1977, 12), who stated that “the more costly and hazardous the possible mis-
takes, the heavier is the reliance on observational learning from competent 
examples.” Although the costly information hypothesis lays emphasis on the 
costs of acquiring personal information, the same reasoning holds with re-
spect to the costs of using personal information.
13.2.1.2. Empirical evidence
Laland and Williams (1998) provide an experimental example in which fish 
were seemingly prepared to pay the costs of using suboptimal foraging in-
formation provided by conspecifics in order to avoid the risk of predation 
associated with the isolated learning of a more efficient foraging route. Small 
groups of “founder” guppies (Poecilia reticulata) were trained to take either an 
energetically costly circuitous route to a feeder or a less costly direct route. In a 
transmission chain design, these founders were gradually replaced with naive 
conspecifics, one individual being replaced each day for a week. Three days 
after all the trained individuals had been removed, the groups of fish whose 
founders were trained to swim the circuitous route continued often to use this 
route to reach the feeder, despite its cost relative to the available direct route. 
In addition, individuals in groups with founders trained to take the circuitous 
route took significantly longer to switch to the short route than did otherwise-
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equivalent solitary fish. It is well established that guppies are reluctant to leave 
conspecifics and forage alone due to predation risk (see Day et al. 2001); thus, 
the perpetuation of a suboptimal behavioral tradition in these fish can be 
explained by the relative cost of acquiring personal information.
Losing visual contact with shoal members is potentially costly to small fish 
like guppies, since isolation leaves them vulnerable to predation (see Day et al. 
2001 and references therein). Kendal et al. (2004) exploited this observation 
to manipulate the cost of using previously acquired personal information in 
a social foraging experiment, in the process providing a second illustration of 
animals utilizing a “copy when asocial learning is costly” strategy. Individu-
als were allocated to one of three conditions in which they received either 
(1) prior personal information only, (2) prior personal and social information, 
or (3) no information (see fig. 13.1). Individuals in the first two conditions 
had the opportunity to learn through direct experience that food was located 
in only one of two differently colored feeders at the ends of their tanks. The 
feeder that contained food was located behind an opaque barrier while the 
one that did not was in open water. In the next stage of the experiment, one 
group was then provided with conflicting social information. The fish in the 
condition that received both personal and social information (2) observed a 
shoal of demonstrators feed at the feeder in the open water, which their per-
sonal experience had indicated never contained food, whereas fish in the other 
two conditions, (1) and (3), were constrained in the central section of the tank, 
facing nondemonstrating fish. Following this observation period, there was a 
test in which the demonstrator shoal was restricted to the center of the tank, 
both feeders were baited with food, and the fish were released to investigate 
where each fed. Fish with both sources of information faced a choice between 
using personal information (i.e., feeding at the feeder that had consistently 
contained food but that necessitated losing visual contact with conspecifics) 
and using the social information (i.e., feeding at a feeder that had never previ-
ously contained food but did not necessitate loss of contact with conspecifics). 
Fish in all conditions fed at the feeder in the open water rather than the one 
behind the opaque partition, supporting the assumption that swimming be-
hind the opaque barrier to feed represented a cost that guppies would avoid 
if possible. However, fish with both sources of information ignored their per-
sonal information and fed at the feeder in the open water more rapidly, and 
with less variability, than did fish with personal information alone (fig. 13.2); 
2. A shoal of fish is a loose aggregation of individuals formed largely for social reasons. When 
members of a shoal school, they move in a highly coordinated and synchronized fashion. The 
experiments discussed in this chapter all involve loosely aggregating “shoaling” fish.
254  •  kendal, coolen, and laland
hence, it would appear that the former used the social information provided 
in preference to their personal information. An otherwise-equivalent prior ex-
periment with no visual barrier, in which the use of personal information did 
not necessitate loss of contact with conspecifics, found that, at test, fish with 
both sources of information, but not those in other conditions, continued to 
use their personal information and ignored the conflicting social information 
(Kendal et al. 2004). As social information outweighed contradictory personal 
information only where the latter was costly to use, it appears that the guppies 
were employing a “copy others when asocial learning is costly” strategy.
Further support for this strategy is provided by Coolen et al. (2003), who 
examined the propensity of wild-caught three-spined Gasterosteus aculeatus 
and nine-spined Pungitius pungitius sticklebacks to use public information 
about the profitability of food patches. In a laboratory test, individual fish 
were restricted to a central compartment of an aquarium from where they 
could see two equivalent-sized shoals of conspecifics each feeding at one of 
two identical but spatially separate feeders. The feeders were designed such 
that observers could not directly see the food, which was dispensed at different 
rates, but could use cues indicating the feeding rates (here, the frequency with 
which individuals pecked at the feeder as the food sank through it) (fig. 13.3). 
Following observation, the demonstrators and all food were removed from the 
tank, and the observer was released and its choice of feeder monitored. Solely 
on the basis of the demonstrators’ success, observers were required to choose 
the richer of the two feeders. At test, nine-spined sticklebacks preferentially 
Figure 13 .2 . The latency (median and interquartile range) of guppies 
to enter the demonstrators’ (no barrier) feeder in the “no information,” 
“prior personal information only,” and “prior personal and social infor-
mation” conditions (**P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001). From Kendal et al. 2004.
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chose the goal zone that had formerly held the rich feeder, suggesting that 
they were able to exploit public information, an interpretation supported by 
Coolen et al.’s other experiments. However, three-spines swam with equal 
frequency to the former locations of rich and poor patches (fig. 13.4). This 
reluctance or inability of three-spines to use prior public information was 
confirmed by Webster and Hart (2006) in a study involving the acquisition 
of subhabitat preferences. In Coolen et al.’s final experiment, observers were 
provided during demonstration with optional use of vegetative cover, which 
nine-spines, but not three-spines, used. The collection of personal informa-
tion in open water is costlier for nine-spines than for three-spines because 
nine-spines have inferior structural antipredator defenses and are consumed 
preferentially by piscivorous fish (Hoogland et al. 1957). Because of these costs, 
nine-spines may forgo the opportunity to collect reliable personal information 
and favor vicarious assessment of foraging opportunities through observa-
tional learning. Thus, public information use in sticklebacks can be regarded 
as an adaptive specialization in learning, reflecting the differential costs of 
personal information acquisition.
In the first explicit test of flexibility in the social learning strategies of Nor-
way rats (Rattus norvegicus), Galef and Whiskin (2006) assessed reliance on 
social information while foraging in risky situations. Following a 30-minute in-
teraction with a demonstrator rat that imparted cues on its breath as to whether 
it had been eating either cinnamon- or cocoa-flavored food, naive rats were 
provided with both cinnamon- and cocoa-flavored food in a single location 
that afforded them little cover/refuge and entailed traversing an open space 
(from the safety of the nest box) to reach it. The potential cost of consuming 
Figure 13.3 . Diagram of the experimental tank setup allowing single 
sticklebacks to observe conspecifics feeding at two feeders. Thick lines 
represent opaque partitions, thin lines represent transparent partitions, 
and dashed lines represent goal zone virtual delimitations. From Coolen 
et al. 2003.
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these unfamiliar foods was increased for the rats by placing two cats in a 
cage in the housing room for either (i ) 4 or (ii ) 24 hours or by (iii ) allowing 
the cats to roam freely. Contrary to Galef and Whiskin’s expectation, rats did 
not eat more of the diet eaten by their demonstrator as potential predation 
risk increased; indeed, individuals under potential predation risk were less 
influenced by the social information than controls, who faced no predation 
risk. Galef and Whiskin interpreted this finding as contrary to the prediction 
that, as the costs of acquiring personal information increase, so should the 
reliance on social information. However, this interpretation is open to ques-
tion. The cost the rats were facing was largely in traveling, over open ground, 
to the food site (where both foods were presented in close proximity), rather 
than in acquiring personal information pertaining to the foods. In contrast to 
control rats, those under stress of potential predation may have chosen a food 
at random without taking the time to either (i ) collect personal information 
or (ii ) use their previously acquired social information.
The cost of acquiring personal foraging information, represented by the 
difficulty of asocial learning, was also manipulated in a study of social forag-
ing in callitrichid monkeys, involving three lion tamarins (Leontopithecus sp.), 
two tamarins (Saguinus sp.), and two marmosets (Callithrix sp.). Day (2003; 
Day et al. 2003) presented a series of novel artificial-fruit tasks, requiring the 
extraction of preferred food items, to zoo-housed groups of monkeys. Judging 
by the time to learn, as well as the amount of food extracted, the tasks varied 
significantly in difficulty. For each task there were two options (doors or holes) 
by which monkeys could extract food, with the alternatives being equivalent 
except in location and color. While the monkeys learned all of the tasks, a 
detailed statistical analysis revealed that the difficult, but not the easier, tasks 
were learned socially (Day 2003). For the difficult, but not the easy, tasks there 
was a significant tendency for individuals within a group to extract food us-
ing the same colored option as others, suggesting nonindependent learning. 
Figure 13 .4 . The proportion of three-
spined and nine-spined sticklebacks that 
entered first the goal zone corresponding 
to the feeder that appeared “rich” rather 
than “poor” during the demonstration 
period (n = 20 for each species). The 
dashed line indicates the proportion  
expected at random (**P < 0.01, n.s. = not 
significant). From Coolen et al. 2003.
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Presumably, the personal information required to solve the easy tasks could 
be acquired at little cost, while the solutions of the more complex tasks were 
associated with a sufficiently large time or energy cost to render social learn-
ing adaptive. Similarly, Baron et al. (1996) reported that human subjects were 
found to imitate more as task difficulty increased.
In summary, although there is little explicit experimentation, that which 
exists provides strong support for animals exploiting a “copy when asocial 
learning is costly” strategy. This is probably the best-supported social learn-
ing strategy.
13.2.2. copy when uncertain
13.2.2.1. Copy when have no relevant information
Theoretical background. Boyd and Richerson (1988) considered a model ex-
ploring the advantages of reliance on social and asocial learning in a tem-
porally variable environment in which animals have to make decisions as to 
which of two environments they are in and choose the appropriate behavior. 
Behavior 1 is appropriate in environment 1, behavior 2 is appropriate in en-
vironment 2, while performing the alternate behavior results in a fitness cost. 
The animals base their decision on the magnitude of a continuous parameter 
(x) representing the outcome of direct observation. At one extreme, if x has 
high values, above a threshold value d, the animals “know” they are in envi-
ronment 1 and perform behavior 1. At the other extreme, if x has low values 
(below -d ), they “know” they are in environment 2 and perform behavior 2. 
However, if x has intermediate values (−d < x < d ), animals are uncertain as to 
whether they are in environment 1 or 2, and it is assumed that they will copy 
the behavior of others.
We note a (i ) broad and a (ii ) narrow interpretation of Boyd and Richerson’s 
assumption. Individuals may be predisposed to rely on social information (i ) 
if they lack relevant prior knowledge to guide their decision making, or (ii ) if 
they are uncertain as to which of several established behavior patterns is ap-
propriate given the information at hand. We are aware of considerable, albeit 
often inadvertent, empirical evidence for the former, whereby totally naive 
individuals use social information, for example, pertaining to the location of 
food, but none for the latter, whereby individuals would be faced with the 
choice, given some social information, of using previously acquired personal 
information, for example, pertaining to the location of food depending upon 
which laboratory “environment” they believed themselves to be in.
Empirical evidence. In an experiment related to that described in section 
13.2.1.2, Kendal et al. (2004) tested in three conditions the propensity of 
guppies to use social information concerning the availability of food at two 
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differentially colored feeders, although this time the use of personal and social 
information did not differ in cost. One group was provided first with personal 
and then with conflicting social information, a second group was given solely 
social information, and a control group was provided with no personal or 
social information at all. They found that fish that were provided with social 
information only, and that lacked relevant prior information, fed at the feeder 
indicated by conspecifics significantly more often than chance expectation. In 
contrast, individuals with both sources of information ignored the social in-
formation and continued to feed according to their personal information. This 
finding holds even when the order in which personal and social information 
are experienced is reversed (i.e., social first, personal second) (Laland, un-
published data). Similarly, Coolen et al. (2003; see section 13.2.1.2) found that 
nine-spined sticklebacks that did not have personal information copied the 
patch choices of others, whereas van Bergen et al. (2004; see section 13.2.2.2), 
testing the same species in an identical setup, found that fish would ignore 
social information when they had relevant personal information.
Social learning may occur as a result of an individual collecting informa-
tion either directly, by observing a particular behavior in others (public infor-
mation), or indirectly, by inferring possible causes of a given behavior pattern 
(social cues). In an extension of the 2003 study, Coolen et al. (2005) exam-
ined the use of direct and indirect social foraging information by nine-spined 
sticklebacks. The number of demonstrators present at each patch varied (two 
vs. six fish), supposedly indicating a poor and a rich patch, respectively. This 
indirect information either conflicted with the demonstrators’ feeding rate at 
each patch (feeding respectively six times vs. twice in the 10-minute demon-
stration) or was the only information available. The sticklebacks were capable 
of using both direct and indirect information to make choices about where 
to forage, but when these contradicted each other, they relied on the direct 
information provided by feeding rate (see fig. 13.5). These findings are consis-
tent with “copy when have no relevant information,” since fish copied their 
demonstrators’ patch choices in both conditions, but also indicate what type 
of social information individuals prefer to use. Direct information tends to be 
associated with greater accuracy, whereas by copying the decisions of others 
(indirect information), one may also copy their mistakes. By relying preferen-
tially on direct information, nine-spines may avoid potentially maladaptive 
informational cascades (Giraldeau et al. 2002).
Galef et al. (2008) also provide support for a “copy when uncertain” strat-
egy being deployed. They created conditions whereby Norway rats were ei-
ther certain or uncertain as to the causal relationship between ingesting an 
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unfamiliar flavor and gastrointestinal upset. Thus, “certain” rats were fed 
cinnamon-flavored food and immediately afterward were injected with lithium 
chloride, and “uncertain” rats were fed a food containing both cinnamon and 
cocoa flavors prior to experiencing toxicosis. After a 24-hour recovery period, 
these rats, having learned that sampling unfamiliar foods can be dangerous, 
were exposed to a demonstrator that had eaten another unfamiliar food (either 
anise or marjoram flavor). Following this, when exposed simultaneously to 
anise- and marjoram-flavored foods for 24 hours, “uncertain” rats ate signifi-
cantly more of the food eaten by their demonstrator than did “certain” rats.
Galef et al. interpret this study as a test of a response to having “ambiguous 
prior personal information.” However, given that the social information indi-
viduals received pertained to different flavors than those experienced during 
personal information, we posit that the rats were not faced with “ambiguous 
personal information” but rather lacked personal information relevant to the 
social information received. While the elevated copying in the “ambiguous” 
social information condition supports the “copy when uncertain” interpreta-
tion, the observation that copying occurs in both conditions to some degree 
might also be interpreted as consistent with a “copy when asocial learning 
is costly” strategy; rats may have learned as a result of their poisoning that 
asocial learning is dangerous in this environment. However, a previous study 
(Galef and Whiskin 2006) showed that rats experiencing toxicosis after in-
gesting variously 1, 2, and 4 different foods did not differ in their subsequent 
use of social information pertaining to unfamiliar foods.
Figure 13 .5 . The mean percentage (+ SE) of time nine-spined stick-
lebacks spent in each patch (n = 20) after they collected both direct 
(demonstrators’ feeding rate) and conflicting indirect information (shoal 
size) about relative patch quality during the observation period (*P < 
0.05, ***P < 0.001). From Coolen et al. 2005.
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13.2.2.2. Copy when prior information is unreliable
Theoretical background. We now consider scenarios where, for whatever rea-
son, personal information is actually less reliable than social information. 
Boyd and Richerson (1985, 1988) modeled the use of social information in 
a spatially heterogeneous environment where individuals experience differ-
ent environments. The average quality of information available from demon-
strators enables individuals to weight their use of asocial and social learning 
according to the likelihood of acquiring erroneous information from each 
source. As environmental heterogeneity increases and personal information 
becomes more error prone, the optimal amount of social learning from local 
residents increases, while as the rate of dispersal between environments in-
creases, social information becomes increasingly unreliable (since individuals 
will increasingly copy “outsiders”), and the optimal amount of social learning 
decreases.
Giraldeau et al. (2002; see Bikhchandani et al. 1992, 1998) proposed that 
individuals may use social information not only because their personal in-
formation is in itself unreliable but because the accumulated knowledge of 
conspecifics potentially represents a source of information with even greater 
reliability. In spite of this, they predict that, in specific instances, reliance on 
the decisions of others can lead to arbitrary or even maladaptive traditions in 
animals (Giraldeau et al. 2002; see also section 13.2.2.1). Theoretical work re-
garding reliability and the value of information in communication and mating 
systems (Sirot 2001; Koops 2004) suggests that, even if the costs of misinfor-
mation are high, animals should still use information, provided that it is usu-
ally reliable. This requires animals to be able to assess the relative reliability 
of personal versus social information correctly.
Empirical evidence. In a study of nine-spined sticklebacks, van Bergen et 
al. (2004) manipulated the reliability of personal information concerning the 
profitability of two foraging patches, using a similar experimental design to 
that of Coolen et al. (2003; see section 13.2.1.2 and fig. 13.3). Fish were allo-
cated to one of three conditions, where they received 100%, 78%, or 56% reli-
able personal information as to which of two feeders was “rich” and which 
“poor.” Following this training period, fish were tested individually for their 
feeder preference. Those in the 100% and 78% reliable conditions significantly 
preferred the “rich” feeder. Subsequently, the profitability of the two feeders 
was reversed, and fish were presented with (now conflicting) public informa-
tion in which they observed demonstrators feeding at the two feeders, with 
what was according to their earlier sampling the poor feeder now the rich 
feeder, and vice versa. Following this demonstration, only fish in the 100% reli-
able condition continued to prefer the feeder that was “rich” according to their 
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personal information; fish in the other conditions exhibited no preference 
(fig. 13.6). Since fish with 56% reliable information probably had not acquired 
private information (they did not prefer the rich feeder immediately after their 
training period), this experiment does not provide unequivocal evidence that 
fish increasingly relied on the social information provided by their demon-
strators as the reliability of their personal experience diminished, although it 
is consistent with this interpretation. It does, however, demonstrate that fish 
with completely reliable personal information will ignore conflicting social 
information.
13.2.2.3. Copy when prior information is outdated
Theoretical background. Boyd, Richerson, and colleagues (Boyd and Richerson 
1985, 1988; Henrich and Boyd 1998) have modeled the use of social informa-
tion in temporally fluctuating environments, finding that intermediate levels 
of fluctuation will be most likely to favor social learning. Here individuals can 
acquire relevant information without bearing the costs of direct interaction 
with the environment associated with asocial learning but with greater phe-
notypic flexibility than if the behavior was unlearned (Boyd and Richerson 
1985, 1988). Consequently, as socially transmitted information becomes in-
creasingly outdated, we might expect individuals to become less likely to rely 
on it.
In other theoretical analyses, Doligez et al. (2003) predicted that strategies 
based on public information use (here the breeding success of conspecifics on 
particular patches) perform best when fluctuation in patch quality is of inter-
mediate or high temporal predictability. Similarly, Moscarini et al. (1998) have 
looked at the effect of a changing world on the likelihood of informational 
cascades and predict that blind copying may occur for some limited time if 
the state of the world changes stochastically but will not happen anymore 
Figure 13 .6 . The proportion of 
nine-spined sticklebacks that, after re-
ceiving personal information of vary-
ing reliability followed by conflicting 
public information, entered first the 
goal zone of the feeder that was “rich” 
according to personal information. The 
dashed line indicates the proportion 
expected at random, and the hatched 
bar represents data from Coolen et 
al. 2003 (*P < 0.05, **P <0.005, n.s. = 
not significant). From van Bergen et 
al. 2004.
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when the environment changes too unpredictably (or randomly). Kameda and 
Nakanishi (2002) reported that in a fluctuating environment, increasing costs 
of asocial learning initially result in an increase in social learning, a concomi-
tant reduction in fresh information, and thus an outdated “cultural knowledge 
pool.” They predict that natural selection will act against reliance on social 
learning based on such flawed information, ensuring cultural knowledge 
tracks environmental change.
These models predict that individuals should acquire personal informa-
tion and ignore social information when the latter is likely to be outdated. 
Equally, individuals should opt to frequently update information if the use 
of their current information, whether acquired asocially or socially, is likely 
to be outdated.
Empirical evidence. Van Bergen et al. (2004) manipulated the degree to 
which personal information regarding the relative profitability of two forag-
ing patches was outdated, and they explored how this prior experience af-
fected individuals’ subsequent acquisition of public information. Nine-spined 
sticklebacks were allocated to one of four conditions, where they received 
personal information as to which of two feeders was “rich” and which “poor” 
1, 3, 5, or 7 days prior to receiving conflicting public information and a test 
of preference. Fish with only a 1-day delay between receiving personal and 
public information ignored the social information and first visited the feeder 
that was “rich” according to their personal information. Fish with delays of 3 
and 5 days showed no feeder preference, and those experiencing a 7-day delay 
preferred the feeder that was “rich” according to the public information (see 
fig. 13.7). Accepting van Bergen et al.’s arguments that personal information 
was not forgotten after 7 days, comparison with results from Coolen et al. 
(2003), where fish received public information only, appeared to indicate that 
Figure 13 .7. The proportion of 
nine-spined sticklebacks that, after 
receiving personal information 
followed at varying time lags by con-
flicting public information, entered 
first the goal zone of the feeder that 
was “rich” according to personal in-
formation. The dashed line indicates 
the proportion expected at random, 
and the hatched bar represents data 
from Coolen et al. 2003 (*P < 0.05, 
**P < 0.005, n.s. = not significant). 
From van Bergen et al. 2004.
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fish in the 7-day condition ignored their personal information in favor of the 
public information. As personal information becomes increasingly outdated, 
nine-spined sticklebacks become increasingly reliant upon socially acquired 
information.
In summary, experimental data support the prediction that animals utilize 
a “copy when uncertain” strategy, although this strategy can be interpreted in 
various ways.
13.2.3. copy when dissatisfied
13.2.3.1. Theoretical background
Schlag (1998) explored an imitation rule that he termed “proportional reser-
vation” but that might be called “copy when dissatisfied,” finding that it is a 
highly effective learning rule. Here, the size of the payoff to its current behav-
ior determines an individual’s satisfaction, as a linear function. The individual 
retains its current behavior with a probability equal to this satisfaction and 
otherwise copies the action of a randomly chosen demonstrator. This strategy 
has the advantage that it is potentially simple to implement, because it does 
not require individuals to assess the payoff to a demonstrator or to make any 
judgment as to the relative profitabilities of alternative behavior patterns. Be-
cause “copy when dissatisfied” requires evaluation only of one’s own success 
(e.g., in terms of satiation), not of the relative success of oneself and others, 
“copy when dissatisfied” seems more likely to have evolved than “copy when 
better” (Laland 2004), which Schlag found to be equally effective.
13.2.3.2. Empirical evidence
Galef et al. (2008) manipulated rats’ dissatisfaction with their diet (experi-
ment 1) or environment (experiment 2). In the first experiment, rats were 
maintained for 1 week on either an unpalatable low-caloric diet, requiring 
increased handling time to maintain their health (dissatisfied condition), or a 
palatable relatively high caloric diet (satisfied condition). Following this, the 
subjects were exposed for 30 minutes to a demonstrator rat carrying cues on 
the breath as to whether it had eaten either a marjoram- or an anise-flavored 
diet. In the following 24 hours the subjects were exposed to both diets, and 
“dissatisfied” rats ate more of the food that their demonstrator had eaten than 
did “satisfied” rats. In the second experiment, rats, essentially crepuscular 
burrowing animals, were housed either on a hard substrate with no cover, 
constant light, and an overly warm ambient temperature (1: dissatisfied condi-
tion) or with bedding, cover, a 12:12 light:dark cycle, and appropriate ambient 
temperature (2: satisfied condition). Again, “dissatisfied” subjects ate more of 
the diet indicated by their demonstrator than did “satisfied” rats.
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In summary, Galef et al.’s experiments are consistent with the strategy of 
“copy when dissatisfied,” although the latter experiment exemplifies “dissat-
isfaction” more broadly than the former. In experiment 2 rats appear to be 
generally dissatisfied with their lot, while in experiment 1 they are specifically 
dissatisfied with their feeding regime—that is, dissatisfied in the same domain 
as the social information. There is, perhaps, a case for characterizing these as 
two separate strategies, although it is interesting to note that both types of 
dissatisfaction translate into the same result with respect to socially induced 
food preferences.
13.3. “Who” strategies
13.3.1. theoretical background
Boyd and Richerson (1985) proposed a number of cultural transmission bi-
ases. For example, a “frequency-dependent bias,” in which the most popular 
variant in a population is disproportionately more likely to be adopted, may 
be translated into the social learning strategy of “copy the majority” (“con-
formist bias”). The opposite, negative frequency-dependent bias for rare vari-
ants can likewise be characterized as “copy if rare.” Henrich and Boyd (1998) 
established that the range of conditions that favor conformist transmission 
is likely broader than that for cultural transmission. However, Eriksson et al. 
(2007) have challenged the theoretical grounds and the empirical evidence for 
a conformist bias; they claim that the assumptions of previous models may be 
unrealistic. Hence, whether animals are expected to use a “copy the majority” 
strategy is very much a controversial point among theoreticians and awaits 
relevant experimentation.
With “direct bias,” individuals adopt cultural variants based upon an as-
sessment of the value of the trait itself, a bias that could be translated into 
a strategy such as “copy if better” (requiring an individual to evaluate the 
relative payoffs of the actions of itself and others; Laland 2004). In contrast, 
with “indirect bias,” traits exhibited by successful or high-status individuals 
may be preferentially adopted, even where the trait in question has abso-
lutely nothing to do with the individuals’ success or status. Indirect bias then 
can be portioned into strategies such as “copy individuals that are success-
ful, high-status (prestige bias), older, or good social learners” (Laland 2004). 
Indeed, the strategy of “copy older individuals” has been assumed in theo-
retical analyses (M. Kirkpatrick and Dugatkin 1994) on the basis of reports 
of mate choice copying in female guppies. Finally, where the adoption of a 
trait is random with respect to its apparent utility transmission is said to be 
“unbiased.” This is different from “indirect bias,” as there is no assumed cor-
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relation between the “type” of individual (e.g., high-status) and the adaptive-
ness of the trait he or she exhibits. Here, individuals would randomly choose 
a “role model” and copy the trait he or she exhibits. Note, the existence of 
“random copying” at a population level is perfectly consistent with individu-
als pursuing directed strategies, provided individuals do not all exhibit the 
same behavior such that they sum up to generate a population-level bias. 
Hence, “unbiased transmission” processes may be translated into strategies 
such as “copy kin” or “copy friends,” where the specifics of who is copied 
vary from one individual to the next. Any kin bias may reflect nothing more 
than the fact that individuals spend considerably more time in the presence 
of kin than non-kin. However, there are two reasons to suspect that selec-
tion may have favored a disproportionate degree of learning from kin. First, 
social learning, particularly in a variable environment, is of use only to the 
extent that demonstrator and observer experience the same environment and 
reap the same rewards (Boyd and Richerson 1985, 1988). This may be more 
likely among kin than non-kin because, by virtue of their shared genes (and 
other sources of similarity), kin may be more likely than non-kin to reproduce 
similar behavior variants and to experience the same affective sensations in 
reinforcement. Second, in situations where information transmission is costly, 
kin may have more to gain by providing reliable information to fellow kin, 
and less to gain from deceiving them, than non-kin. Witness, for example, 
teaching among worker ants (Franks and Richardson 2006) and bees (von 
Frisch 1967). Similarly, if friends are regarded as individuals with whom one 
trades altruistic acts (Trivers 1971), by similar lines of reasoning we might ex-
pect more social learning among friends than nonfriends, in a “copy friends” 
strategy.
In accordance with mathematical theory, Coussi-Korbel and Fragaszy 
(1995), after observing the relation between social dynamics and social learn-
ing in nonhuman primates, stressed directed social learning. Here, the social 
rank, sex, age, patterns of association, and other characteristics of demonstra-
tor and observer critically affect the probability of social learning. As a result, 
information may be transmitted through subsections of animal societies at 
different rates.
13.3.2. empirical evidence
13.3.2.1. Frequency-dependent bias
Following Boyd and Richerson (1985), we treat a conformist bias as entailing a 
disproportionate tendency to copy the majority. We do not review here recent 
empirical studies pertaining to a broader interpretation of “conformity” (see 
Whiten and van Schaik 2007; Galef and Whiskin 2008).
266  •  kendal, coolen, and laland
Day et al. (2001) found evidence for conformity in a series of experiments 
investigating how shoal size affects foraging efficiency in fish. Hidden food 
was presented to shoals of guppies, and large shoals were found to locate food 
faster than small shoals, consistent with similar findings in other fishes. This 
is probably because fish in large shoals have more shoal mates from whom to 
acquire information, and in open water large numbers of individuals at a food 
site will attract conspecifics more rapidly than small aggregations. However, 
in a second experiment, the fish had to swim through a hole in an opaque 
maze partition to get to a food source, and in this situation the opposite result 
was found: smaller shoals located food faster than larger shoals. The seem-
ingly conflicting findings of these experiments make sense in the light of the 
observation that guppies prefer to join large, rather than small, shoals, which 
implies that individuals ought to be more willing to leave smaller shoals than 
larger shoals. Swimming through an opaque partition to locate food involved 
breaking visual contact with, and hence effectively leaving, the shoal. Under 
such circumstances, conformity, or a strategy of “copy the majority,” resulting 
from the natural shoaling tendency of these fish, results in greater reluctance 
to acquire a novel behavior in large shoals than in small shoals, at least early 
in the diffusion process. This interpretation was supported by the findings of 
a third experiment, which replicated the second except for using a transpar-
ent partition: individuals in large shoals once again located the food faster 
than those in small shoals. Here visual contact between fish was maintained 
because the partition was transparent, so fish passing through it behaved 
as if they were not leaving the shoal. Here, social transmission of foraging 
information was not hindered by conformity, and large shoals were again 
advantaged.
McElreath et al. (2005) had groups of people repeatedly play a computer-
based task (planting one of two crops that gave different yields), either (i ) 
where asocial learning alone was possible, (ii ) with the opportunity to view 
the previous choice of one randomly selected group member (allowing social 
learning), or (iii ) with the opportunity to view the previous choices of all group 
members (allowing conformity). The use of social information increased when 
individual learning was relatively inaccurate, thus confirming the strategy of 
“copy when uncertain” (see section 13.2.2). Similarly, although models indi-
cated that conformity was the better strategy under all conditions, it was used 
only when the environment fluctuated—hence, when there was a cost to indi-
vidual learning. Similarly, Efferson et al. (2008), in another computer-based 
study, found considerable, as yet unexplained, heterogeneity in the extent to 
which humans follow a strategy of “copy the majority,” even when doing so 
would be in their interests. In accordance with these findings are those of 
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Eriksson et al. (2007) indicating that the likelihood of conforming is highly 
context dependent. People reported that, when presented with vignettes per-
taining to either a scenario of novel food choice (different soups) or one of 
punishment of social defectors (defection being the undertaking of large print 
jobs on a communal machine), they would conform in regard to the former 
but not the latter.
In summary, empirical evidence for utilization of a “copy the majority” 
strategy is surprisingly weak, given the emphasis on conformity in the social 
science literature.
13.3.2.2. Indirect bias
Mesoudi and O’Brien (2008) provide the first attempt to simulate the cultural 
transmission of prehistoric artifacts in order to determine whether theoretical 
predictions can explain patterns observed in the archeological record. They 
examined a previously observed pattern in which the attributes (e.g., length 
and width) of arrowheads dating to AD 300–600 were poorly correlated with 
each other in eastern California but were well correlated in central Nevada. 
The pattern in California was thought to be due to cultural transmission in-
volving “guided variation” (individual trial-and-error experimentation of at-
tributes) and that in Nevada due to “indirect bias” (wholesale copying of a 
successful individual’s design) (Bettinger and Eerkens 1999). Mesoudi and 
O’Brien’s study involved participants playing a computer game whereby they 
tested “virtual projectile points” in “virtual hunting environments.” Consistent 
with “indirect bias” and a strategy of “copy the most successful individual” 
they found that individuals chose to copy the arrowhead design of the single 
most successful demonstrator. In addition, where individuals were allowed 
to adapt their culturally acquired arrowheads via individual trial-and-error 
learning (“guided variation”), the resulting arrowheads were less uniform in 
design than those of individuals allowed only to choose which individual to 
copy arrowhead attributes from (their hunting success being indicated on 
screen). Consistent with the adaptiveness of a strategy of “copy if asocial learn-
ing is costly” (see section 13.2.1), participants who could engage in indirectly 
biased cultural transmission outperformed those engaging in individual learn-
ing, particularly when the latter was costly (modifications incurred a caloric 
penalty).
13.3.2.3. Unbiased transmission
Many fish express preferences for shoaling with familiar individuals (Griffiths 
2003), and we may interpret a strategy of “copy familiar individuals” in the 
same light as “copy friends” or “copy kin.” Guppies have been reported to 
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acquire foraging information faster when in groups of familiar individuals than 
when in groups of unfamiliar individuals (Swaney et al. 2001). A meta-analysis 
by Reader (2000) found disproportionate numbers of reports of learning from 
mothers in nonhuman primates. Galef and Whiskin (unpublished data) have 
explicitly attempted to examine the influence of both familiarity and kinship 
on the transmission of food preferences in rats. Following a similar protocol 
to that outlined above, they found that both familiar-kin and familiar-non-kin 
had an equivalent social influence as unfamiliar-kin and unfamiliar-non-kin, 
respectively. However, when considering only studies where observer rats in-
teracted simultaneously with familiar and unfamiliar individuals, regardless of 
relatedness, they found unfamiliar individuals to have the greatest social influ-
ence over subsequent food preferences. Galef (personal communication) sug-
gests that the peculiarities of rat social life, where interaction with a strange 
conspecific takes precedence over social interaction with a known individual, 
may override any strategy of “copy kin or familiar individuals.”
13.4. Evolutionary implications
An individual animal’s use of social learning strategies may generate specific 
population-level effects on evolutionary processes. For instance, theoretical 
analyses suggest that a strategy of “copy the majority” may underlie wide-
spread cooperation generated by cultural group selection, while a strategy of 
“copy successful individuals” may generate runaway prestige markers that 
become exaggerated in a similar manner to runaway sexual selection (Boyd 
and Richerson 1985). Maladaptive cultural traditions may result from the (aso-
cial learning) costs of breaking a convention or from informational cascades 
(Giraldeau et al. 2002) where individuals base behavioral decisions on a prior 
decision of others without observing the cue upon which that decision was 
based (akin to personal information). When “asocial learning is costly” or  “un-
certainty” reigns, animals and humans may be more likely to engage in erro-
neous or maladaptive informational cascades (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 
1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Laland and Williams 1998).
Consideration of social learning strategies may explain why social learning 
abilities appear to reflect ecological (environmental and social) rather than 
taxonomic affinities among species. There may be a greater reliance on social 
information in species that use complex foraging skills or must overcome 
challenging prey defenses than in species that do not (e.g., folivorous vs. fru-
givorous species: Fragaszy and Visalberghi 1996; extractive vs. nonextractive 
foragers: Day et al. 2003; Zentall 2004); but see Lefebvre and Giraldeau 1996 
for caution regarding inferences based on comparative studies of social learn-
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ing. Although our findings cast doubt on the widespread belief that social 
learning is particularly important to large-brained species, Sol (chapter 7 in 
this volume) argues for a positive correlation between innovation, the starting 
point of any socially learned trait, and brain size.
In fact, the accumulating evidence for social learning strategies may guide 
researchers in the difficult task of assessing the plausibility of social learning 
being involved in any observed patterns of behavioral variation in the wild 
(see Laland et al., in press). For example, given the theoretical and empiri-
cal support for a “copy when asocial learning is costly” strategy, researchers 
might reasonably question the plausibility of putative cultural traits that are 
relatively simple and cheap to acquire asocially. Similarly, a growing under-
standing of the contexts in which social learning is used may enhance our 
understanding of factors that may have influenced the evolution of cultural 
capacities. For example, several empirical findings (e.g., Coolen et al. 2003; 
Kendal, unpublished data) indicate that the costs associated with acquiring or 
using personal information may promote the evolution of increasingly com-
plex social learning processes. If replicated in our closest ancestors, these 
findings may shed light on the evolution of the potent cultural capacity of 
humans. Theoretical studies indicate that an individual’s ability to adopt a 
strategy of “copy if better” may be more important for the evolution of a cu-
mulative culture than either conformist transmission or imitation (Eriksson 
et al. 2007; Enquist and Ghirlanda 2007). Thus, a “cognitive deficit” in evalu-
ating the relative payoff of actions performed by the self and by others, pre-
venting animals from discriminating between cultural variants (or “adaptive 
filtering”), may explain why cumulative culture appears to be virtually unique 
to humans. Incidentally, a similar line of reasoning, regarding cognitive abili-
ties (e.g., theory of mind) required to cope with increasingly complex social 
life, may be important in the apparent distribution of social intelligence and 
deception in human and nonhuman animals (see Federspiel, chapter 14 in 
this volume). Indeed, for some, a theory of mind is deemed necessary for both 
imitation and cumulative culture (Tomasello 1990).
In contrast, several of the proposed social learning strategies may actually 
hinder the cultural transmission of information. As we have seen, a strategy 
of “copy the majority” may hinder the adoption of novel information in large 
groups (Day et al. 2001), and a recent theoretical study (Eriksson et al. 2007) 
indicates that it may also hinder the development of cumulative culture. In 
addition, a strategy of “copy high-status individuals” may inhibit the spread 
of novel information where the innovator, as is often the case in primates, is 
of low status (Reader and Laland 2003). The apparent failure of most animal 
innovations to spread (Reader and Laland 2003) has a profound influence on 
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species’ evolution and survival, not least because the ability to adopt innova-
tions is implicated in invasion success and the ability to respond to anthro-
pocentrically altered environments (Lee 1991; Sol et al. 2002; Sol, chapter 7 
in this volume).
13.5. Summary and future directions
In summary, we report good support for several “when” strategies, particu-
larly “copy when asocial learning is costly,” “copy when uncertain,” and “copy 
when dissatisfied.” However, in many cases the precise strategy employed 
is ambiguous, conditional, and context specific. In contrast, support for the 
existence of “who” strategies is weaker, and even the comparatively well es-
tablished “copy the majority” strategy remains contentious in the absence of 
unambiguous support.
It is early days in the study of social learning strategies, and clearly further 
research is necessary before a deep understanding is gained of how and when 
acquired social information is used. We would like to encourage further em-
pirical research in this area, particularly as there is a paucity of direct investi-
gation, in nonhuman animals especially. Of particular interest is investigation 
into whether there is a hierarchy in the implementation of strategies (Laland 
2004). For example, individuals might practice unbiased transmission (e.g., 
copy kin) unless they have access to relevant biased transmission information 
(e.g., copy high-status/successful individuals) or can afford to invest in the 
time, energy, or cognition required for individual learning/direct bias. We note 
also that many of the studies investigating “who” strategies hint at the exis-
tence of conditional strategies. For example, both of the reviewed conformist 
transmission studies (Day et al. 2001; McElreath et al. 2005; section 13.3.2.1) 
and, to a certain extent, the results of another study in guppies (Kendal et al. 
2004; see section 13.2.1.2) appear to indicate a mixed strategy of “copy the 
majority when asocial learning is costly.” Individual characteristics of observ-
ers, favoring the overriding of social learning strategies, and the continued 
acquisition of personal information (as reported by Efferson et al. 2008 and 
Kendal et al. 2004 with regard to conformity), may be influential in determin-
ing the innovatory capacities of individuals.
In parallel, we argue that there is considerable potential for fruitful integra-
tion of empirical and theoretical work, particularly game-theoretical analyses 
(Laland and Kendal 2003; Laland 2004). We hope that consideration of the 
trade-offs inherent in the adaptive use of social and asocial learning will con-
tribute to an increased understanding of the observed pattern of social learn-
ing and behavioral traditions in the animal kingdom, especially as the use of 
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social information may lead to cultural evolution, which may in turn affect 
biological evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Feldman and Laland 1996; 
Danchin et al. 2004).
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